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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.SUMMARY 
This appeal is over the primary issue of the District Court's sua sponte decision in 
favor of Respondents in a default proceeding holding that Appellant Maria Garcia 
("Maria"), a legal permanent resident and mother, and Appellant Jose Luis Garcia ("Jose 
Luis"), who filed a petition for a legal permanent resident status and son of Maria, are not 
legally eligible to seek or receive consequential damages due to their immigration status. 
Maria hired Respondents to post bond in a misdemeanor criminal matter for her 
son (Jose Luis) with the expressed purpose that 1. Jose Luis had applied for and not yet 
received his Legal Permanent Residence card and 2. Time was of the essence and the 
bond needed to be placed quickly due to an ICE hold that would be placed any day. 
Respondents posted the bond and revoked it the same day, the 15th of October 2012 and 
falsely informed the Appellants the jail was at fault for the delay. Respondents also failed 
to inform the Appellants he revoked the bond, and failed to return the payments. 
An ICE hold was placed on the 1 J1h of October 2012 and Appellants' money was 
never returned. Jose Luis remained in custody until the 3rd of May 2013, until his 
criminal matter was resolved due to the ICE hold placed the 1 J1h of October 2012. Jose 
Luis was removed from the country due to an unlawful sentence and forfeited his 
application for Legal Permanent Residence even though he appealed and corrected his 
illegal sentence. The District Court again denied Appellants' consequential and other 
damages due to an incorrect factual finding and failed to account that the Respondents 
posted and revoked the bond before the ICE hold was placed. 
APPELLANTS' OPENING BRJEF: l 
BACKGROUND 
Maria is a United States Legal Permanent Resident (Record, 109-130, paragraph 2). 
Maria filed a family application for her children including her son Jose Luis with the 
United States Department of Justice Immigration and Naturalization Service to become 
Legal Permanent Residents wherein Jose Luis was required to remain in the United States 
until final approval (Record, 109-130, paragraphs 4-8) (Record, 135 - 143, paragraph 3-
7). Jose Luis and Maria received an Approval Notice dated the 20th of July 1999 and 
were waiting for final processing of the application for Jose Luis (Record 135-143, 
paragraphs 4). 
Maria, monolingual Spanish speaking (Record, 11, paragraph 2) hired 
Respondents on the 15th of October 2012, while waiting for the above application to be 
processed, to post bond for her son Jose Luis who was charged with misdemeanor 
matters (Record, 51-54 ). Maria and her family contacted Respondents, informed them 
that Jose Luis had not yet received his formal Legal Permanent Residence Card that the 
bond needed to be posted immediately to prevent an ICE Hold. Respondents agreed to 
the express condition and purpose that the bond be placed immediately to prevent 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement "ICE" from placing a hold on Jose Luis (Record, 
109-130, paragraphs 11-12). The ICE hold required Jose Luis to remain in custody 
during the pendency of his criminal matter. Respondents posted the bond on the 15th of 
October 2012 but then revoked bond the same day, contrary to the agreement and 
contract between the parties and never informed Maria or her family that he did such 
(Record l 09-130, paragraph 20) (Record, 135 - 143, paragraph 17). Respondents lied to 
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Maria and her family and blamed the delay on the Sheriffs Office while knowing the 
delay was due to Respondents revocation of the bond. (Record 51-54, paragraphs 5-12). 
Respondents again lied to Maria and her family and told them additional delay was due to 
the need for Maria and Jose Luis to pay for an ankle bracelet which they arranged and 
paid for on the 17th of October 2012 (Record 109-130, paragraphs 24-25). Respondents' 
revoking and failing to notify Maria and Jose Luis that he revoked the bond prevented 
them from being able to post the bond or hire a separate bondsman before the ICE hold 
was placed on the 1 ih of October 2012. 
After the ICE hold was placed on the 17th of October 2012 on Jose Luis (Record 
51-54, paragraph 13) Mr. Garcia remained in the Canyon County Jail from the 15th of 
October 2012 until the 3d of May 2013 when he was initially sentenced (Record 51-54, 
paragraph 13). Jose Luis successfully corrected his illegal sentence; however, the ICE 
hold did not allow Jose Luis to remain in the United States during his criminal appeal 
which resulted in the correction of his sentence to only 106 days and obtained a ruling 
that his original sentence was unlawful (Record, 90-105). Had Jose Luis remained in the 
United States during the Appeal, he would have not been removed as the corrected 
sentence resulted in Jose Luis being eligible for Legal Permanent Resident had he not left 
the United States because the corrected sentence was less than six months under 8 U.S.C. 
section l 101(a)(43)(G) or 8 U.S.C. section l 182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
Suit was filed against Respondents herein for breach of express and implied 
contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of Idaho Code 
48-603C and their fiduciary duty, failure to provide an accounting under Idaho Code 28-
9-601 et sec and Idaho Code 48-603(13), bad faith, reimbursement on the funds paid, 
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interest, costs, attorney fees, pecuniary damages, consequential damages, and relief to 
amend the complaint to include punitive damages. The District Court ruled on the 21st of 
November 2013 that Appellants were not legally eligible to seek or receive consequential 
damages requested in their complaint due to the immigration status; Appellants 
subsequently filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration or for the Honorable Judge 
Southworth to recuse himself under I.R.C.P 40( d)(2) with a legal basis of such (Record 
59-67). The Honorable Judge Southworth denied such motion for reconsideration or for 
recusal on the 13th of December 2013 and failed to provide any basis, reasons or grounds 
to deny such (Record, 68-69). 
Appellants filed a motion to amend the complaint to include punitive damages 
under Idaho Code 61-604 and I.R.C.P 15(a) based upon the previous affidavits filed, the 
sworn complaint and additional supportive affidavits (Record, 71-143) all supporting the 
allegation that Respondents revoked the bond before the ICE hold knowing that it was 
almost certain to result in Mr. Garcia's deportation. However, the District court denied 
such motion based upon the incorrect factual finding that the Respondents revoked the 
bond "after finding that an ICE hold had been placed of Mr. Garcia ... " [ emphasis added] 
(Record, 148-149). Such ruling was contrary to the evidence that stated the bond was 
placed and revoked on the 151h and the ICE hold was not placed until the 1 ih of October 
2012 (Record 109-130, paragraph 20) (Record, 135 - 143, paragraph 17). Appellants 
reminded the court at the April 23, 2015 hearing three times that the court's 
understanding was backwards that the bond was placed and revoked before the ICE hold 
was placed (Hearing, 6: 4-6) again (Hearing, 12:6-20) and again (Hearing, 13:6-10. 
Appellants provided an additional affidavit, with leave of the court (Hearing, 14: 1-8), 
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again supporting the bond was placed and revoked on the 15th of October 2012 and the 
ICE hold was not placed until the 17th of October 2012 and that Respondents never 
notified Appellants of either (Record 109-130, paragraphs 10-17) (Record, 135-143 
paragraphs 12-18); however, the court continued with the incorrect finding that the ICE 
hold was placed first and that that allowed the Respondents to subsequently withdraw the 
bond. 
The District Court at the April 23, 2015 hearing repeated his previous ruling that 
his court could not enter an order for consequential damages for the Appellants due to the 
immigration status. (Hearing, 7:5-10). Appellants argued that the Respondents knew 
that the ICE Hold was coming and of its harm to the Appellants. The Respondents not 
only revoked the bond, but failed to notify the Appellants of the coming ICE hold or the 
need to hire another bail bondsman (Hearing, 7: 11 - 9: 15). This behavior, along with the 
Respondent's failure to return the funds paid to him, manifests an intent on the part of the 
Respondent to see the Appellant deported in order to keep the money paid to him. The 
District court denied Appellants' Motion to Amend the Complaint on the 6th of May 2015 
(Record, 144-150) after making an incorrect finding that the bond was revoked after the 
ICE hold was placed. 
The District also, sua sponte, without a hearing, notice or opportunity to argue the 
damages, ordered the amount of damages in the Memorandum Decision and Order upon 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Re: Punitive damages and failed to grant interest, filing fees, 
other costs, etc. (Record, 144-150). The District Court also, sua sponte, issued a Final 
Judgment on the 6th of May 2015 (Record, 152-153). 
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FACTUAL BASIS 
Maria testified in her Affidavit (Record 51-54): 
1. I am the mother of Jose Luis. 
2. I previously contracted, hired and paid the Defendants to bond Jose Luis out 
of jail without any complications. 
3. I subsequently entered into contract on the 15th of October 2012 at 
approximately 8:30 AM where the Defendants contracted to pay the bonds 
for Jose Luis in CR 2012-25742-C and CR 2012-23262-C. 
4. I paid the Defendants $800.00 for the first case and $500.00 for the second 
case for the Defendants to post the bonds in the above cases which were 
$3,200.00 combined. 
5. The Defendants posted the bond; however, the Defendants kept giving 
excuses why my son was not released and stated that the sheriff was not 
doing the paperwork correctly. 
6. n/a 
7. Jose Luis was not released due to the Defendants withdrawing the bond paid 
and the Defendants never notified me of such for various months. 
8. Approximately one week later I learned through an attorney that Jose Luis 
was not released because the Defendants withdrew the bond; the defendants 
admitted to me in February 2013 that they withdrew the bond. 
9. I complied with each and every requirement under my contract and 
agreement with the Defendants. 
10. I contacted the Defendants at his home office and asked what happened and 
his employee informed me I did not need to do anything wrong and had 
complied with the above contract and that the error was due to the jail. 
11. I learned that after the bonds were withdrawn, that an immigration hold was 
placed. 
12. If the Defendants complied with the above contract and did not withdraw the 
bond, that Jose Luis would have been released before the ICE hold was 
placed and may not have been placed. 
13. My son Jose Luis was not released from the jail until approximately the 3rd of 
May 2013 when he was subsequently taken to Mexico. 
14. On or about the 8111 of February 2013 I was present when the Defendants 
admitted telephonically that my son and I complied with the above contract 
and gave truthful information to them when we contracted them and knew 
that time was of the essence to post the bond to prevent an ICE hold from 
being placed due to immigration problems of Jose Luis. 
15. n/a 
16. Jose Luis was living with me and provided substantial financial assistance to 
me and the Defendants knew we lived together. 
17. Jose Luis was working in Wilder doing maintenance, cleaning and other 
manual labor working 45 hours weekly and earned $9.50 per hour. 
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18. I picked up Jose Luis's paycheck from his employer after Jose Luis was 
arrested on or about the 17th of October 2012 and learned Jose Luis would 
have continued his employment if the bonds were paid as contracted. 
19. The Defendants failed to communicate with me and failed to produce the 
records, information and other documents as alleged in the Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial filed herein. 
20. The Defendants also failed to refund and or account for any of the funds paid 
as alleged above. 
21. n/a 
22. pJa 
23. I have hired the services of other bail bondsmen of for additional cases and 
Defendants' actions and breach of the above contract is intentional, reckless, 
and an extreme deviation of reasonable standard of conduct. 
24. A foreseeable and proximate damage from the Defendants' actions and 
inactions is that I lost approximately 20 days of work and I lost $9.00 per 
hour and 9 hours per each day. 
25. A foreseeable and proximate damage from the Defendants' actions and 
inactions is that I suffered deep depression for the loss of my son while he 
was in jail and after he was sent away. 
26. Jose Luis lost his trailer he was purchasing before being arrested that he and I 
was living in; I was forced to leave Jose's trailer shortly after he was arrested 
because I could not pay the fees due to the money paid to bail bondsman. 
27. Jose Luis also had a car that was forced to be sold in February 2013 to retain 
the services of an attorney to help us with the bail bonds matter and with the 
criminal matter. 
28. Jose Luis is currently living in unsafe conditions living outside of the home of a 
friend due to his financial loss. 
29. n/a 
Maria testified in her Second Affidavit (Record 109-130): 
1. n/a 
2. I am legally in the United States and have been since 2007 as reflected in Exhibit 
A. 
3. I have three children and came to the United States after the father of my children 
left me. 
4. I applied for all of my children to be legal in the United States in 1998. 
5. Exhibit B is a copy of the Passport of my daughter Anaya Garcia reflecting that 
she is a United States Citizen. 
6. The application for Jose Luis was delayed when he reached 21 years and he was 
placed into a separate category and we submitted an amended application. 
7. That Jose Garcia was required to remain in the United States during the pendency 
of his Immigration application for his position or her would have to reapply for 
legal status and lose his position if he left the United States. 
8. The application for Jose Luis lost his priority and starts over due to him leaving 
the United States. 
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9. Prior to hiring the Defendants and entering into a contract on the 15th of October 
2012 at approximately 8:30 AM where the Defendants contracted to pay the bonds 
for Jose Luis in CR 2012-25742-C and CR 2012-23262-C, I informed the 
Defendants that Jose Luis had not received approval of his immigration 
documentation yet and that the bond needed to be placed quickly to prevent an 
ICE hold from being placed; the ICE hold would have prevented Jose Garcia from 
being released and would result in him being held for additional 48 hours. 
10. The Defendants informed me they posted the bond immediately on the 15th of 
October 2012 after receipt of our payments to ensure that an ICE hold would not 
be placed. 
11. After posting the bond, the Defendants told us to wait outside waiting for him to 
be released with his clothes; however, the Defendant informed me that the Canyon 
County Sheriff paperwork was taking longer than expected and that we needed to 
return the next morning with additional money. 
12. The Defendants informed me that I needed to wait and I waited at the jail the 
entire day of the 15th of October 2012 without any answers. I went home and 
returned the morning of the 16th of October 2012 and waited the entire day. 
13. I paid the Defendants $1,300.00 for bond on the above cases. 
14. On the 1 ih of October 2012 the Defendant informed me that I also needed to also 
pay for an ankle bracelet wherein I paid for the ankle GPS bracelet and made 
arrangements for it to used on the 17th of October 2012. 
15. However, on the 1 ih of October 2012, the Sheriff department informed me that 
the6 would not release Jose Luis because of the ICE hold that was placed on the l i of October 2012; after the Defendants posted and withdrew the bonds. 
16. I confirmed that Defendants withdrew the above bail bonds on the same day that 
he posted the bonds on the 15th of October 2012, and that took place the ICE hold 
was not posted until the next day on the 1 ih of October 2012. 
17. Defendants subsequently admitted to me that Jose Luis was not released due to the 
Defendants withdrawing the bond on the 15th of October 2012; Defendants further 
admitted that after they withdrew the bond in the above cases, Immigration placed 
an ICE hold on Plaintiff a day or two later. 
18. n/a 
19. My son Jose Luis was not released from the jail until approximately the 3rd of May 
2013 when he was subsequently taken to Mexico. 
20. My son Jose Luis's application with Immigration will be delayed due to his lack of 
presence in the United States. 
21. Had the bond not been revoked, Jose Luis would have been released within 48 
hours of the ICE hold and he would not have been deported. 
22. Had ICE came and picked up Jose Luis at the end of the 48 hours, Jose Luis would 
have been eligible to remain pending his application because there would not have 
been a conviction or sentence that would have made him deportable. 
23. On or about the 81h of February 2013 I was present when the Defendants admitted 
telephonically that my son and I complied with the above contract and gave 
truthful information to them when we contracted them and they knew that time 
was of the essence to post the bond to prevent an ICE hold from being placed due 
to immigration problems of Jose Luis. 
APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF: 8 
24. That I have a medical condition which causes me substantial seizures and am 
unable to provide for myself. 
25. Jose Luis was living with me and provided substantial financial assistance to me 
and the Defendants knew we lived together. 
26. I have hired the services of other bail bondsmen of for additional cases and 
Defendants' actions and breach of the above contract is intentional, reckless, and 
an extreme deviation of reasonable standard of conduct. 
27. A foreseeable and proximate damage from the Defendants' actions and inactions is 
that I suffered deep depression for the loss of my son while he was in jail and after 
he was sent away. 
28. That after our attorney sent the packet of records to the United States Customs and 
Border Protection on or about the 15th of April 2014, Attached as Exhibit C, I went 
to the border with my son Jose Luis wherein the officials denied his entry and Jose 
Luis was not able to be present at his resentencing in the Criminal Case. 
29. I went to the border on two separate occasions to ask for the United States 
Customs and Border Protection as my son Jose Luis's first sentence was continued 
to attempt to get permission a second time. 
30. Due to the Defendants' acts and misrepresentations, the foreseeable and proximate 
damage from the Defendants' actions and inactions is that I lost in excess of 30 
days of work and I lost $9.00 per hour and 9 hours per each day. 
31. n/a 
Dulce Garcia testified (Record, 135 - 143): 
1. I am the daughter of Maria and sister of Jose Luis and am a competent adult over 
the age of 21 years of age. 
2. I have been legally present in the United States 2003 and am currently a Legal 
Permanent Resident as reflected in Exhibit A. 
3. My mother and step father filed an application with the U.S. Department of 
Justice Immigration and naturalization Service for the Plaintiff Jose L. Garcia, for 
me, and for my sister Ana C. Garcia on or about the 14th of May 1999 and Exhibit 
B is a true and correct copy of such Application. 
4. Our family received an Approval Notice on or about the 20th of July 1999 and 
Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of such Approval Notice. 
5. The children, including the Plaintiff, were assigned the priority date of the 28th of 
June 1999. 
6. Myself and my sister Ana were made Legal Permanent Residents; however, 
Plaintiff Jose Luis has 21 years of age and he was required to submit an 
supplemental petition placing him in a longer wait category. 
7. We were notified that if we left the United States before our application was 
eligible for approval, our application would be withdrawn and abandoned. 
8. I was present when my Mother, Plaintiff Maria hired and paid the Defendants and 
hired the Defendants. 
9. Prior to my Mother Paying the Defendants the $1,300.00, Defendants were 
advised that Plaintiff Jose Luis needed the bond placed immediately to prevent an 
ICE hold. 
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10. We also notified the Defendant the reason for the bond was because Plaintiff Jose 
Luis was not yet a Legal Permanent Resident. 
11. Defendants agreed to post the bond before and ICE hold was made. 
12. The Defendants informed us they posted the bond immediately on the 15th of 
October 2012 after receipt of the payments to ensure that an ICE hold would not 
be placed. 
13. After posting the bond, the Defendants told us to wait outside waiting for him to 
be released with his clothes; however, the Defendant informed us that the Canyon 
County Sheriff paperwork was taking longer than expected and that we needed to 
return the next morning with additional money. 
14. The Defendants informed us that we needed to wait and we waited at the jail the 
entire day of the 15th of October 2012 without any answers. We went home and 
returned the morning of the 161h of October 2012 and waited the entire day. 
15. On the 17th of October 2012 the Defendant informed us that we also needed to 
also pay for an ankle bracelet wherein our Mother paid for the ankle GPS bracelet 
and made arrangements for it to used on the 1th of October 2012. 
16. However, on the 1 J1h of October 2012, the Sheriff department informed us that 
the6 would not release Jose Luis because of the ICE hold that was placed on the It of October 2012; after the Defendants posted and withdrew the bonds. 
17. We confirmed that Defendants withdrew the above bail bonds on the same day 
that he posted the bonds on the 15th of October 2012, and that took place the ICE 
hold was not posted until the next day on the I J1h of October 2012. 
18. Defendants subsequently admitted to us that Jose Luis was not released due to the 
Defendants withdrawing the bond on the 15th of October 2012; Defendants further 
admitted that after they withdrew the bond in the above cases, Immigration placed 
an ICE hold on Plaintiff a day or two later. 
19. On or about the 8th of February 2013 I was present when the Defendants admitted 
telephonically that my son and I complied with the above contract and gave 
truthful information to them when we contracted them and they knew that time 
was of the essence to post the bond to prevent an ICE hold from being placed due 
to immigration problems of Jose Luis. 
Appellants filed an uncontested sworn Complaint (Record, 4-13) as follows: 
l .-5. n/a 
6. Plaintiff Maria contacted Defendants regarding posting the bond of her son Jose 
Luis. 
7. Plaintiffs previously hired the Defendants in a 2012 previous case and previously 
had informed the Defendants that Plaintiff Jose Luis was not a U.S. Citizen and 
was not currently documented with immigration. 
8. Plaintiff Maria expressly informed the Defendants of the need to post the bond in 
a timely manner to prevent any immigration official complications due to Jose 
Luis was not a U.S. Citizen and may have immigration problems. 
9. n/a 
10. n/a 
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11. Plaintiff Maria accepted the offers of the Defendants in the paragraphs above, 
paid consideration in exchange for the Defendants posting the full bond amount in 
both cases above. 
12. Defendants posted the necessary bond in both criminal cases above wherein 
Plaintiff Maria went to the jail and waited the release of her son Plaintiff Jose 
Luis. 
13. The jail subsequently did not release Plaintiff Jose Luis. 
14. On or about the gth of February Plaintiff Maria telephoned Defendants who 
admitted that he was informed prior to receiving the consideration from Plaintiff 
Maria that Plaintiff Jose Luis was not a U.S. Citizen and knew before posting the 
bond that Plaintiff Jose Luis was not documented with immigration and knew of 
the need to post the bond posted quickly due to the immigration problems. 
15. During the above conversation with the Defendants on the gth of February 2013 
Defendant admitted that after posting the bonds on both calls, he received a call 
from immigration authorities requesting that the Defendants revoke the bond 
posted for the Plaintiff Jose Luis wherein the Defendants revoked the bond before 
the Plaintiff Jose Luis was released from custody. 
16. During the above conversation with the Defendants on the gth of February 2013 
Defendants admitted that Plaintiffs did not make any misrepresentations in 
obtaining the bond, that the Plaintiffs were truthful, and did not revoke the bond 
due to actions or inactions by the Plaintiffs. 
17. Plaintiffs complied with each and every requirement under the above agreement, 
paid every bill received from the Defendants after hiring the attorney herein and 
Defendants failed to comply with the express and implied terms of the agreement 
despite written demands for such and caused Plaintiffs damages in an amount 
established in trial including but not limited to over six months of incarceration, 
loss of wages, loss of service, loss of companionship, etc. 
18. There are certain elements of damages provided by law that Plaintiffs are entitled 
to have the jury consider in determining the sum of money that will fairly and 
reasonably compensate him for his damages caused by the acts of the Defendants 
and those elements of damage include, but are not limited to, the following, both 
up to the time of trial and in the future: 
a. Expenses and damages stemming from Plaintiffs failure to be released 
from custody; 
b. Damages suffered by Plaintiff as a result of being incarcerated for an 
extended period of time including, lost earnings and lost earning capacity 
sustained and to be sustained by Plaintiff and loss of liberty. 
c. The reasonable amount necessary to reimburse Plaintiff for time spent on 
additional tasks necessitated by this injury, such as seeking further legal help; 
d. Recovery for damages to property and/or lost property; 
e. Reasonable attorney fees; and 
f. The costs of prosecuting and presenting the evidence in this case. 
g. The other natural and foreseeable consequences caused by failure to 
ensure that the Plaintiff Jose Luis's bond was posted and not revoked and 
spending the subsequent time in custody. 
19. n/a 
APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF: 11 
CAUSE 1: BREACH OF EXPRESS AND OR IMPLIED CONTRACT 
20. Plaintiff Maria entered into a contract with the Defendants wherein Plaintiff 
provided consideration to Defendants who agreed to post the entire bail amount of 
Jose Luis who was the expressed and implied third party beneficiary to the 
contract. 
21. Plaintiffs complied with each and every requirement under the above agreement 
and Defendants failed to comply with the express and implied terms of the 
agreement despite written demands for such and caused Plaintiffs damages in an 
amount established in trial including but not limited to over six months of 
incarceration, loss of wages, loss of service, loss of companionship, etc. 
CAUSE 2: BREACH OF IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH / FAIR 
DEALING 
22. Defendants also breached the corresponding implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing inherent in every contact as the Plaintiffs did not receive the benefit of 
the agreement as outlined above and are did not receive any benefit to the 
consideration given to the Defendants. 
CAUSE 3: BREACH OF IC 48-603C AND FIDUCIARY DUTY 
23. Defendants had a fiduciary duty as a Bail Bondsman of the Plaintiffs and under IC 
48-603( c) to post and not revoke the bail and or to fail to refund the consideration 
paid and such was an unconscionable method, act or practice as the Defendants 
knew of the condition of the Plaintiffs. 
CAUSE 4: FAILURE TO PROVIDE RECORDS AND ACCOUNTING 
24. Plaintiff requested in writing the financial records of the Plaintiff from the 
Defendants on various occasions, including but not limited to the 1st of March 
2013 as reflected in Exhibit A without receiving records, accounting, or the 
information sought. 
25. Defendant, upon information and belief, has failed or refused to maintain the 
above records of the Plaintiffs who is a protected class of person outline above. 
26. Defendant also failed and refused to provide such financial records regarding the 
Plaintiffs in violation of the above statutes and Idaho Code 28-9-601 et. sec, 
specifically 28-9-210, 28-9-608, 28-9-615, 28-9-616 and 48-603(13). 
CAUSE 5 BAD FAITH 
27. That Defendant is guilty of bad faith breach of contract by failing to abide by the 
terms of the contract or refund the consideration paid. 
28. That Plaintiffs and their attorney made several attempts to convince Defendants of 
the error without a response to date. 
29. Defendants have intentionally and unreasonably denied payment, thus 
Defendant's denial is not fairly debatable and has resulted in Plaintiff sustaining 
damages not fully compensable in contract. 
30. For reasons stated above, Defendants' denial is reckless, intentional breach of the 
agreement between the parties, and an extreme deviation of reasonable standard 
of conduct and extreme disregard of the likely consequences of the conduct and 
must pay damages in an amount to be proven at trial. Plaintiff will seek to amend 
the Complaint Idaho Code § 6-1604 to add a claim for punitive damages. 
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31. That as a direct and proximate result of the conduct of the Defendants as herein 
alleged, Plaintiffs was caused to suffer loss of employment in an amount, scope 
and extent subject to proof at trial. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment against the Defendant as follows: 
1. For pecuniary damages in the amount paid to the Defendant per the 
contract; 
2. For consequential damages allowed pursuant to law including but not 
limited to wage loss, loss of use, and interest on such losses consistent with LC. § 
12-120(1) and consistent with the demand letter submitted to Defendants herein; 
3. For compensatory damages for the Plaintiff regarding all general damages 
available pursuant to law and consistent with LC.§ 12-120(1), and consistent with 
the demand letter submitted to Defendants herein; 
4 For allowance to amend the complaint to allege other causes of action 
including, but not limited to punitive damages as the court deems appropriate to 
deter willful breaches of contract and extreme deviations from the reasonable 
standard of conduct. 
5. For pre-judgment interest on the amount due at the rate provided in Idaho 
Code 28-22-104 and for costs and reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 48-608(5), 12-120(1), 12-121, 12-123 et al., Rule 54, and such other and 
further relief as the Court deems just and proper. A reasonable amount of 
attorney fees is $2,500.00 if default is entered or additional if contested. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiff, pursuant to Rule 3 8 (b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
hereby demands a trial by jury of all issues so triable by right herein. Plaintiff is 
willing to have a jury panel ofless than twelve (12) jurors. 
VERlFICA TION PAGE 
Maria, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 




make the following statements to the best of my personal knowledge. 
I am Hispanic and am monolingual Spanish. 
n/a 
Appellant sent Request for Admissions that were never denied (Record, 26-50): 
1. That at the time of the events described in Plaintiffs Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial, the Defendant Walter Almaraz was an agent and or 
employee of Absolute Bail Bonds LLC. 
2. That at the time of the events described in Plaintiffs Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial, the Defendant Walter Almaraz was acting as an 
independent agent and not working as an employee or agent of Absolute 
Bail Bonds LLC. 
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3. That at the time of the events described in Plaintiffs Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial, the Defendant Walter Almaraz was acting outside 





8. Plaintiff Maria contracted with Defendants regarding posting the bond of 
her son Jose Luis in Canyon County CR 2012-23262-C. 
9. Plaintiff Maria contracted with Defendants regarding posting the bond of 
her son Jose Luis in Canyon County CR 2012-25742-C. 
10. Plaintiff Maria paid Defendants funds in relation to the above contract to 
post the bond for her son Jose Luis. 
11. n/a 
12. n/a 
13. Defendants posted the bond of her son Jose Luis in Canyon County CR 
2012-23262-C on or about October 2012. 
14. Defendants posted the bond of her son Jose Luis in Canyon County CR 
2012-25742-C on or about the October 2012. 
15. n/a 
16. Defendants subsequently revoked the bond previously paid on behalf of 
Jose Luis in Canyon County CR 2012-25742-C on or about October 2012. 
17. Defendants subsequently revoked the bond previously paid on behalf of 
Jose Luis in Canyon County CR 2012-23262-C on or about October 2012. 
18. Defendants failed and or refused to refund any funds paid by Plaintiffs to 
Defendants. 
19. Exhibit A herein is a true and correct copy of a letter sent to Defendants 
on or about the 1st of March 2013. 
20. Defendants herein failed to provide any records in response to Exhibit A. 
21. Defendants herein failed to provide any information in response to Exhibit 
A. 
22. Defendants violated Idaho Code 48-603(13) for failing and refusing to 
provide Plaintiffs a copy of the contract herein relating to the bonds for 
Jose Luis. 
23. Defendants violated Idaho Code 48-603(13) for failing and refusing to 
provide Plaintiffs a copy of the documents signed by the Plaintiffs after 
receiving Exhibit A. 
24. Defendants failed and refused to provide Plaintiffs an accounting of any 
and all payments made by Plaintiffs before suit was filed herein after 




28. The following statements accurately reflect the statements made on the gth 
of February 2013 by Mr. Almaraz: (Please answer individually) 
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a. Before posting the DUI and Petty Theft bonds, Mr. Almaraz was 
advised by our client's family that Jose Luis was not documented. 
b. Before posting the DUI and Petty Theft bonds, Mr. Almaraz was 
advised by our client's family that Jose Luis had immigration 
problems. 
c. Before posting the DUI and Petty Theft bonds for Jose Luis, Mr. 
Almaraz was advised by our client's family that an Immigration ICE 
Hold was placed or will likely be placed shortly and the bond needed 
to be placed immediately. 
d. Mr. Almaraz admitted that Plaintiffs did not give any false or 
misleading statements before posting the bond. 
e. That the reason for revoking the bond was not due to any thing the 
Plaintiffs or his family said or did, but because the ICE agent advised 
him to revoke the bond. 
f. That Mr. Almaraz revoked the one or more bond(s) bond for Jose Luis 
despite previously knowing of our client's immigration problems. 
29. n/a 
30. n/a 
31. Plaintiffs previously hired the Defendants in a 2012 previous case and 
previously had informed the Defendants that Plaintiff Jose Luis was not 
currently documented with immigration. 
32. Plaintiff Maria expressly informed the Defendants of the need to post the 
bond in a timely manner to prevent any immigration official complications 
due to Jose Luis was not a U.S. Citizen and may have immigration 
problems. 
33. Defendants offered to post the bond for Jose Luis in Criminal Cases Cr 
2012 25742-C where Jose Luis was charged with Driving under the 
Influence. 
34. Defendants offered to post the bond for Jose Luis in Criminal Cases Cr 
2012 23262-C where Jose Luis was charged with Petty Theft. 
35. Plaintiff Maria accepted the offers of the Defendants in the paragraphs 
above, paid consideration in exchange for the Defendants posting the full 
bond amount in both cases above. 
36. n/a 
37. The jail subsequently did not release Plaintiff Jose Luis. 
38. Plaintiffs complied with each and every requirement under the above 
agreement. 
39. Plaintiff Maria entered into a contract with the Defendants wherein 
Plaintiff provided consideration to Defendants who agreed to post the 
entire bail amount of Jose Luis who was the expressed and implied third 
party beneficiary to the contract. 
40. Defendants breached the corresponding implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing inherent in every contact as the Plaintiffs did not receive 
the benefit of the agreement as outlined above and are did not receive any 
benefit to the consideration given to the Defendants. 
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41. Defendants had a fiduciary duty as a Bail Bondsman of the Plaintiffs and 
under IC 48-603(c) to post and not revoke the bail and or to fail to refund 
the consideration paid and such was an unconscionable method, act or 
practice as the Defendants knew of the condition of the Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiff requested in writing the financial records of the Plaintiff from the 
Defendants as reflected in Exhibit A without receiving records, 
accounting, or the information sought. 
43. Defendants failed or refused to maintain the above records of the Plaintiffs 
who is a protected class of person outline above. 
44. Defendants also failed and refused to provide such financial records 
regarding the Plaintiffs in violation of the above statutes and Idaho Code 
28-9-601 et. sec, specifically 28-9-210, 28-9-608, 28-9-615, 28-9-616 and 
48-603(13). 
45. Defendants violated in bad faith a contract by failing to abide by the terms 
of the contract or refund the consideration paid. 
46. That Plaintiffs and their attorney made several attempts to convince 
Defendants of the error without a response to date. 
4 7. That as a direct and proximate result of the conduct of the Defendants as 
herein alleged, Plaintiff Jose Luis was caused to suffer loss of freedom. 
48. That as a direct and proximate result of the conduct of the Defendants as 
herein alleged, Plaintiff Jose Luis was caused to suffer loss of 
employment. 
49. That as a direct and proximate result of the conduct of the Defendants as 
herein alleged, Plaintiff Jose Luis was caused to suffer loss of association 
with his family and friends. 
50. n/a 
51. $185.00 per hour is a reasonable rate for an attorney to prosecute this type 
of case. 
Jose Luis stated in his declaration (Record 20-25): 
That during his time in jail experienced fights, other inmates stole his food, another 
inmate hung himself and such was a traumatic experience for the Appellant and caused 
him depression. Jose Luis was the financial provider for his home and mother as his 
mother was sick. Jose Luis, due to the incarceration and inability to provide, lost his 
truck, his wife and his family. Jose Luis was further, due to failure of being released, 
transferred to Mexico without his family and without a job, sometimes without eating and 
sleeping in the parks. He was treated by a Psychologist to help him overcome the trauma 
he experienced due to the jailing and being sent to Mexico. 
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II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
a. Did the District Court err as a matter of law or abuse their discretion when 
the Court denied Appellants' consequential damages due to the 
immigration status and refused to reconsider or recuse himself after 
making such oral ruling on the 21 51 ofNovember 2013 and subsequent 13th 
of December 2013 Order Denying Motion to Recuse himself? 
b. Did the District Court err as a matter of law or abuse their discretion when 
the Court denied Appellants' consequential damages, Appellants' costs, 
Interest pursuant to Idaho Code 28-22-104, and the Courts refusal to allow 
Appellants to amend their complaint to include punitive damages? 
HI. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Over questions of law the Idaho Supreme Court exercises free review. Kawai 
Farms, Inc. v. Longstreet, 121 Idaho 610, 613, 826 P.2d 1322, 1325 (1992); Cole v. 
Kunzler, 115 Idaho 552,555,768 P.2d 815,818 (Ct. App. 1989). "Where 'the evidence 
reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a question of law remains, over 
which this Court exercises free review."' Stonebrook Const., LLC v. Chase Home Fin., 
LLC, 152 Idaho 927, 930, 277 P.3d 374, 377 (2012). When a district court decides a 
motion to reconsider, "the district court must apply the same standard of review that the 
court applied when deciding the original order that is being reconsidered." Fragnella v. 
Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012). 
The Court exercises "free review over the lower court's conclusions of law, 
however, to determine whether the court correctly stated the applicable law, and whether 
the legal conclusions are sustained by the facts found." Nampa & 1vferidian Irr. Dist. v. 
Washington Federal Sav., 135 Idaho 518, 521, 20 P.3d 702, 705 (2001). A trial court's 
decision to grant or to deny a motion to amend a pleading is reviewed by this Court under 
an abuse of discretion standard. Indian Springs, LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv., LLC. 
147 Idaho 737, 750, 215 P.3d 457, 470 (2009) (citing Silver Creek Computers, Inc. v. 
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Petra, Inc., 136 Idaho 879, 881, 42 P.3d 672, 674 (2002)). "A trial court does not abuse 
its discretion if it ( 1) correctly perceives the issue as discretionary, (2) acts within the 
bounds of discretion and applies the correct legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision 
through an exercise of reason." O'Connor v. Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 
188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008) (citing West Wood Invs., Inc. v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75, 82, 106 
P.3d 401, 408 (2005)). "To determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion, this 
Court considers whether the district court: (1) perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
acted within the outer boundaries of that discretion consistent with applicable legal 
standards; and (3) reached its decision through the exercise of reason." Hansen v. 
Roberts, 154 Idaho 469,472, 299 P.3d 781, 784 (2013). 
IV. ARGUMENTS 
a. The District Court erred as a matter of law when the Court sua 
sponte ruled that consequential damages were not allowed due to the 
immigration status of the party; The District Court abused its 
discretion when it refused to recuse himself. 
i. Consequential damages are allowed despite immigration status 
Nothing in Idaho law limits the ability of Plaintiffs to recover damages based 
solely on their immigration status. Even so, the district court took it upon itself to rule 
that Plaintiffs would not be entitled to consequential damages because of their status as 
non-citizens. Not only did this preclude Mr. Garcia from receiving damages based on his 
deportation, but also precluded him from receiving damages based on his increased time 
spent incarcerated and his lost wages, both of which were foreseeable and direct 
consequences of Respondents breach of contract. Further, the ruling denied to Ms. 
Garcia, a legal permanent resident, the possibility of recovering the full measure of 
damages under Idaho law such as loss of protection, comfort, society and companionship 
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see Checketts v. Bowman, 70 Idaho 463, 220 P.2d 682 (1950) as well as punitive 
damages and other damages. 
ii. The court abused its discretion by issuing sua sponte rulings not 
based on the evidence in the record. 
Adam Milani and Michael Smith, in the 2002 Article, Playing God: A Critical 
Look at Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate Court, stated as follows: 
In the legal setting, sua sponte describes a decision or action undertaken 
by a court on its own motion as opposed to an action or decision done in 
response to a party's request or argument. As such, the concept of "sua 
sponte" is an important exception to two basic principles of our adversary 
system of adjudication: (1) that the parties will control the litigation, and 
(2) that the decision maker will be neutral and passive. STEPHAN 
LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN 
APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION 35-39 (1988); Jerold H. Israel, Cornerstones 
of the Judicial Process, KAN. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y, Spring 1993, at 5; Ellen 
E. Sward, Values, Ideology and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 
IND. L.J. 301, 316-19 (1989). 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Deon v. H & J, INC, 339 P. 3d 550, Idaho (2014) 
also recently stated: 
This Court has had occasion to address the propriety of a tribunal sua 
sponte raising defenses or theories in the tort arena. In Sales v. Peabody, 
the Court recently had before it a dispute in which the district court raised 
sua sponte the affirmative defense of an intervening, superseding cause of 
injury in a tort case. 157 Idaho 195, 335 P.3d 40 (2014). There we held 
that it was error for the district court to raise this affirmative defense sua 
sponte and dispose of the case based on the defense, which had never been 
asserted by the defendant before the court raised it. Id. at 201, 335 P.3d at 
46; see also Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527,531, 887 
P.2d 1034, 1038 (1994) (where we reversed the district court's grant of 
summary judgment, holding it was improper for the court to sua sponte 
raise the proximate causation issue). 
The district court may not grant summary judgment on a ground raised sua 
sponte. Sales v. Peabody, Idaho Supreme Court (2014 Opinion No. 99); Thomson v. 
Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 531, 887 P.2d 1034, 1038 (1994). The Court 
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addressed the issue of the court's sua sponte ruling in Massey v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 
156 Idaho 476, 328 P.2d 456 (2014) where the court held that a district court's sua sponte 
dismissal of a claim is in error when neither party raised the issue and no opportunity was 
given to argue the issue. Id. at 483, 328 P.3d at 463. 
The District Court's sua sponte action to raise an affirmative defense on behalf of 
the Respondents and order that that Appellants are not eligible for consequential damages 
due to the immigration status is improper, violates due process and Equal Protections 
laws, is not supported by law and should be overturned. 
When filing a motion for summary judgment, the moving party, must notify the 
opposing party of the particular grounds for the motion. When a court issues a decision 
sua sponte, they should follow the same procedures. The motion must "state with 
particularity the grounds therefore including the number of the applicable civil rule, if 
any, under which it is filed, and shall set forth the relief or order sought." Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 7(b)(l). The Idaho Supreme Court, in referring to IRCP 7(b)(l) m 
Patton v Patton, 88 Idaho 288, 292 (Idaho 1965): 
In Steingut, supra, it was stated that 'There should be strict compliance 
with the rules, otherwise they will be whittled away and become 
meaningless and unenforceable' Further, practice demands that the basis of 
the motion and the relief sought shall be clearly stated If this be done to 
the end that the other party may not assert surprise or prejudice, the 
requirement is met Monjar v Higgins, D.C., 39 F Supp 633 (1941) And, 
where it fails to state with particularity, then it is not in conformity with 
the Rules Trammell v Fidelity & Casualty Co of New York, D.C., 45 
F.Supp. 366 (1942). 
The Supreme Court in Patton reversed a custody order because the record of the 
trial court was vacant of any evidence to support the claims outlined in the complaints. 
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The Idaho Appellate Court stated in Mason v. Tucker and Associates, 125 Idaho 
429,432. (Idaho App. 1994) stated: 
... in Hellickson v Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273, 796 P 2d 150 (Ct App 1990), 
we held that the magistrate erred in considering evidence outside the 
pleadings on a motion under I R C P 12(b)(6) without expressly 
converting the motion to one for summary judgment under I R C P 56 and 
giving the parties a reasonable opportunity to present evidence pertinent to 
a summary judgment motion See also Kelly v Hodges, 119 Idaho 872, 876, 
811 P 2d 48, 52 (Ct App 1991) (vacating summary judgment entered on 
counterclaim where the motion had requested judgment only on the 
plaintiffs complaint) We do not suggest that summary judgment may 
never be entered by a court sun sponte or on grounds other than those 
raised by the moving party. However, in such event, the party against 
whom the judgment will be entered must be given adequate advance 
notice and an opportunity to demonstrate why summary judgment should 
not be entered See WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, IOA FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 2720 at 27-28 
The District Court was not given adequate notice or opportunity to respond to 
prevent the orders herein. The Idaho Appellate court in Fournier v Fournier, 125 Idaho 
789, 791-92 (Idaho App. 1994) upheld such statute and dismissed an order from a 
Magistrate that was upheld by the District Court because of the violation ofIRCP 7(b )(1 ). 
Further, the decision cannot be based on arguments or facts not before the court. 
This court recently clarified in Westby v. Schaefer and Mercy Medical Center, Docket 
No. 40587, 2014 Opinion No. 121, page 10, that a court cannot base its decision on 
arguments not supported by affidavits or facts not before the court. The District Court's 
sua sponte order on the 21st of November 2013 and subsequent denial of the Verified 
Motion for Reconsideration denying Appellants' consequential damages (Record, 59-68) 
should be overturned. 
iii. Due Process and Equal Protection 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Pentico v. State of Idaho (2015 Opinion No. 63) stated: 
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To determine whether an individual's due process rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment have been violated, courts must engage in a two-
step analysis. Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136 Idaho 63, 72-73, 28 
P.3d 1006, 1015-16 (2001). The Court must first decide whether the 
individual's threatened interest is a liberty or property interest under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Only after a court finds a liberty or property 
interest will it reach the next step of analysis in which it determines what 
process is due. Id. The United States Supreme Court has held that the right 
to petition government for a redress of grievance is a liberty interest 
intimately connected to the First Amendment. United lvfine Workers of 
America, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217,222 (1967). 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection 
of citizens. It says: "Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws." These provisions are universal in their application, to all persons 
within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of 
nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal 
laws. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US 356 - Supreme Court 1886. 
In Plyler v. Doe 457 U.S. 202 (1982) the Supreme Court struck down a Texas 
statute denying free public education to illegal immigrants as a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because discrimination on the basis of 
illegal immigration status did not further a substantial state interest. The Court reasoned 
that illegal aliens and their children, though not citizens of the United States or Texas, are 
people "in any ordinary sense of the term" and, therefore, are afforded Fourteenth 
Amendment protections. 
It is unquestioned that all residents, regardless of immigration status, even 
undocumented immigrants, enjoy the protections extended by the United States Constitution 
in civil and criminal proceedings. The Idaho Supreme Court ruled in Sanchez v. Galey, 
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112 Idaho 609 (1986) that Mr. Garcia is entitled to his lost wages and other consequential 
damages, despite his immigration status. In Sanchez the court upheld a jury verdict in a 
civil action that awarded an undocumented alien present and future wages based on his 
current income as a worker in Idaho, present and future medical, as well as pain and 
suffering. The court even went on to rule that remanding the case to the jury with 
instructions to consider even the possibility of the Plaintiff earning fewer wages due to a 
potential deportation "would invite mere speculation." Id at 624. 
The 9th Circuit appellate decision Rivera et al., v. Nibco, Inc., upheld the Plaintiff's 
right to seek damages and even seek to be reinstated with their previous employer even 
when his immigration status was at issue. 364 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (cert. 
Denied)(Mar. 7, 2005) The court in Rivera held that immigration status is not relevant 
because of the grave "chilling effect" it would have on parties in civil matters. Id at 
1064. See also Bevies Co., Inc. v. Teamsters Local 986, 791 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(upholding arbitration awards granting back pay to undocumented employees); EEOC v. 
Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1989) (following Felbro regarding back pay 
availability); EEOC v. Tortilleria "La Mejor," 758 F.Supp. 585 (E.D. Cal. 1991) (scope 
of Title VII not diminished by passage of IRCA). 
Therefore, denying the Plaintiff access to consequential damages associated with the 
causes of action herein solely based on Mr. Garcia's immigration status is contrary to 
established law including the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which 
applies to all people and not solely citizens. Such a denial is also contrary to Idaho and U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent as such would be also an Equal Protection and Due Process 
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violation. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 1070, 30 L. Ed. 220 
(1886) 
The fourteenth amendment to the constitution is not confined to the 
protection of citizens. It says: 'Nor shall any state deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' These 
provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the 
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, 
or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the 
protection of equal laws. It is accordingly enacted by section 1977 of the 
Revised Statutes that 'all persons within the jurisdiction of the United 
States shall have the same right, in every state and territory, to make and 
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and 
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and 
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like 
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, 
and to no other.' The questions we have to consider and decide in these 
cases, therefore, are to be treated as involving the rights of every citizen of 
the United States equally with those of the strangers and aliens who now 
invoke the jurisdiction of the court. 
iv. State Punishments due to Immigration Status is Improper 
The power to expel aliens has long been recognized as an exclusively federal 
power. See Fok Yung Yo v. United States, 185 U.S. 296, 302, 22 S.Ct. 686, 688, 46 L.Ed. 
917 (1902); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 706-07, 13 S.Ct. 1016, 1019, 
37 L.Ed. 905 (1893). The power to exclude and the related federal power to grant an alien 
permission to remain "exist as inherently inseparable from the conception of nationality." 
See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304,318, 57 S.Ct. 216,220, 81 
L.Ed. 255 (1936). This is so because the federal government "is entrusted with full and 
exclusive responsibility for the conduct of affairs with foreign sovereignties," which 
includes the field of immigration. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-63, 61 S.Ct. 399, 
402, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941); see also Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2506-07; Chy Lung v. Freeman, 
92 U.S. 275, 279-80, 23 L.Ed. 550 (1876). In light of these principles, a state's or courts 
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decision to impose "distinct, unusual and extraordinary burdens and obligations upon 
aliens" may constitute an impermissible intrusion into the federal domain. Hines, 312 
U.S. at 65-66, 61 S.Ct. at 403. 
Congress has passed laws concerning immigration and established punishments 
for violations of those laws. Violating immigration law does not abrogate rights guaranteed 
to all people in the courthouse and access to the courts for redress of their damages. 
Individuals suspected or even convicted of other and much more serious crimes are not 
prohibited from bringing suit and being awarded appropriate damages and neither are illegal 
immigrants; 
Congress, had it seen fit so to do, might have provided that an alien 
making an illegal entry into the country should be denied all civil rights, 
and the protection of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments. Congress has 
not so acted. It was content to make an illegal entry a mere misdemeanor 
punishable by imprisonment for a period not to exceed one year, or a fine 
of not more than $1,000, or both fine and imprisonment (U.S.C. title 8, § 
180(a) (8 U.S.C.A. § I80(a). It is not for the court to add to these penalties 
by depriving him of his property, in this case the right to recover damages 
for the injury inflicted by defendant. 
Martinez v. Fox Valley Bus Lines, 17 F. Supp. 576, 577 (N.D. Ill. 1936) 
While political pressure to treat undocumented immigrants differently due to their 
immigration status is a reality; however the law does not allow state courts to enact any 
penalties upon plaintiffs due to their immigration status. The field of immigration 
regulation is completely preempted by the federal government. '"[O]ver no conceivable 
subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over' the admission 
of aliens." State v. Pando, 921 P.2d 1285, 1287 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996)(quoting Fiallo v. 
Bell, 430 U.S. 787,792 (1997)(citation omitted)). Immigration law is under federal 
control, and state participation in the field of immigration law is preempted. State v. 
Arviso, 993 P .2d 894 (Utah Ct. App. l 999)(invalidating a sentence stating, "Defendant 
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shall serve 90 days jail with release to INS for deportation. The prison sentence is 
suspended on condition the defendant not return to the United States," holding the 
sentence unconstitutional under the preemption doctrine from the Supremacy Clause of 
the United States Constitution.) 
Such participation encroaches on federal control in violation of the Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution of the United States. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the 
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution 
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI cl. 2. 
Some judges have taken it upon themselves, to go so far as to banish criminal 
defendants from the state or country at sentencing and such was considered 
unconstitutional, an abuse of discretion, inconsistent with the federal statutory scheme 
and in violation of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. US v. 
Castillo-Burgos, 501 F.2d 217, 219-220. Castillo-Burgos was ordered deported by the 
district court at the end of his prison term. The Ninth Circuit ruled this sentence 
exceeded the trial judge's authority, vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. 
Id. at 219-220. See also US. v. Hernandez, 588 F.2d 346, 347 (2nd Cir. 1978). US. v. 
Romeo, 122 F.3d 941 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Ramirez-Perez, 166 F.3d 1106 
(11th Cir. 1999). US v. Jalilian, 896 F.2d 44 7, 447-48 (10th Cir. 1990). State v. Arviso, 
993 P.2d 894 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Courts have gone so far to say that State Courts was 
without authority to even "make findings as to Defendant's deportability," or 
immigration status, State v. Pando, 921 P.2d 1285, 1287 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996). 
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The sua sponte order stating that Appellants are ineligible for consequential 
damages due to the immigration status appears to be a punishment that is exclusively for 
the United States Federal Agencies and the State does not have any authority over such. 
v. Public Policy 
If the policy and practice is for the court to deny consequential damages in the 
civil arena to undocumented residents, the natural and probable unfortunate outcome 
would be the slippery slope to abuse and discrimination of the protected class of 
minorities living in Idaho. 
Denying consequential damages to individuals due to the immigration status 
would also lead to discovery disputes in each case regarding the immigration status of the 
injured parties and would require the courts to make legal findings of immigration status. 
See State v. Pando, 921 P.2d 1285, 1287 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996). 
The court in Rivera held that immigration status is not relevant and found the 
protective order granted by the lower court was justified because of the grave "chilling 
effect that the disclosure of plaintiffs' immigration status could have on their ability to 
effectuate their rights." Further, "[W]hile documented workers face the possibility of 
retaliatory discharge for an assertion of their labor and civil rights, undocumented 
workers confront the harsher reality that, in addition to possible discharge, their employer 
will likely report them to the INS and they will be subjected to deportation proceedings 
or criminal prosecution." Id at 1064. The Supreme Court declined to review the decision 
upholding an order limiting employers' inquiries into plaintiffs' immigration status. 
Additionally, compelled disclosure of immigration status hurts documented workers: 
Even documented workers may be chilled by the type of discovery at issue 
here. Documented workers may fear that their immigration status would 
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be changed, or that their status would reveal the immigration problems of 
their family or friends; similarly, new legal residents or citizens may feel 
intimidated by the prospect of having their immigration history examined 
in a public proceeding. Any of these individuals, failing to understand the 
relationship between their litigation and immigration status, might choose 
to forego civil rights litigation. 
Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 2004) 
The National Labor Relations Board in Rivera, at 1064, expressed identical 
concerns when, in connection with a complaint of unfair labor practices, the employer's 
counsel inquired into employees' length of residence in the United States, places of 
education, previous employment, and also subpoenaed their passports, "green cards," and 
employment authorization cards. In finding that this "intimidation of witnesses" 
constituted an unfair labor practice, the Board concluded that: 
The only excuse which counsel could proffer [for the subpoenas] was that 
he wanted to test the credibility of all those witnesses by calling into 
question whether they signed their proper names on their pretrial affidavits 
. . . He offered no other evidence tending to show that any one of them, 
other than Figueroa, was working or testifying under an assumed name. 
His pretext for seeking these documents for this purpose was a transparent 
fiction . 
. . . [T]he effect upon the General Counsel's witnesses of this wholly 
irrelevant probe into their immigration status which [the administrative 
law judge] observed at the hearing ranged from unsettling to devastating 
and certainly affected their ability to testify. 
Further, the consequences of disallowing benefits would have disastrous effect in 
Idaho. Senator Craig has specifically reported that up to 85% of farm labor workers in 
Idaho are undocumented in 2006. See http://craig.senate.gov/i_agjobs.cfm (December 
21, 2006) Prominent and regular news reports, including the PewResearchCenter, report 
that unauthorized immigrants living in the United States grew during the last decade from 
8.4 million in 2000 to 11.1 million in 2011. http://www.pewhispanic.org/2013/0l/29/a-
nation-of-immigrants/ (July 30, 2013). 
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In the monograph entitled "Illegal Immigration in Idaho" author Idaho State Sen. 
Michael Jorgensen states "According to the Pew Hispanic Research Center, Idaho was 
home to 25,000-45,000 illegal aliens in 2005 .... Over half of the illegal aliens in the state 
live in this Idaho County." Idaho State Sen. Michael Jorgensen, Illegal Immigration In 
Idaho, page 1. Attached hereto as Addendum 1. The report of a study conducted by the 
Pew Hispanic Center, released in January of 2011, reported that the number of illegal 
immigrants in the US labor force was approximately 8 million, representing 5% of 
workers in the US. Addendum 2. See, also, Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant 
Population Residing in the United States: January 2009 published by the United States 
Department of Homeland Security, 
vi. The District Court should have recused itself. 
IRCP 40( d)(2) allows for the disqualification when a judge has been biased or 
prejudiced for or against a party. The District Court's sua sponte raising of the 
affirmative defense for the Respondents and making a legal finding that Appellants are 
not eligible for consequential damages reflects a decision made before the evidence and 
arguments were presented to the court. The Idaho Supreme Court in Akers v. White 
Construction, Inc (2014 Opinion No. 5) cited Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 
153 Idaho 411,424,283 P.3d 728, 741 (2012), and allowed for the appointment of a new 
District Judge to provide a much needed fresh perspective and eliminate any concern of 
bias on remand even though there was not a finding that he District Judd did not err in 
refusing to disqualify himself to eliminate any concerns. 
b. The District Court erred as a matter of law and abuse 
its discretion when the Court sua sponte denied Appellants' 
consequential damages, Appellants' costs, Interest pursuant to IC 28-
APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF: 29 
22-104, and the Courts refusal to allow Plaintiffs to amend their 
complaint to include punitive damages. 
The District Court's Order and final judgment entered on the 6th of May 2015 
(Record 144-152) included a sua sponte decision denying Appellants' demands sought in 
the Complaint including for a Jury Trial, pre-judgment interest on the amount due at the 
rate provided in Idaho Code 28-22-104, costs, etc. was improper and should be 
overturned. At a minimum the court should have granted interest on the money owed as 
such as easily ascertainable and due immediately upon the breach. The order failed to 
account for filing fees, service fees, and other costs. Appellants incorporate herein the 
arguments made above regarding the impropriety of sua sponte decisions. 
i. The District Court's sua sponte decision denying relief under 
Idaho Code 48-601 was improper. 
The decision regarding damages failed to account for the Causes of Action, 
including, but not limited to Appellants' Third Cause of Action, a violation of Idaho 
Code 48-603C under Idaho Code 48-601. Idaho Code 48-601 et sec. protects consumers 
against unfair and deceptive acts and practices in the conduct of trade or commerce and 
to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protections. Idaho Code 
48-602(7) states that the Consumer Protection Act applies to Respondents' services, 
work, labor or other act or practice provided or performed by the Respondent. 
Respondents violated Idaho Code 48-603C, as his actions above, before and after 
entering into the contract, were unconscionable in the conduct of his trade. Idaho Code 
48-603c((l)(a-d) apply to the Appellants as they knew of the vulnerable state of a young 
man in jail and a mother needing him released who had limited language abilities in 
English, Respondents knew of the vulnerability of the Appellants, and the acts would 
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outrage and offend the public conscience. Respondents further violated Idaho Code 48-
603(13) for failing to deliver to the Appellants the signed contract to date the copy of the 
contract and documents signed by Appellants. Respondents further violated Idaho Code 
48-603(9), (13), (17), and or (18) when he misled the Appellants regarding his services, 
withdrawing the bond, and for blaming the Sherriff for the reason for the delay. 
Idaho Code 48-608(1) allows the greater of the actual damages or $1,000 which is 
larger and section (4) also allows costs and "reasonable attorney's fees to the plaintiff if 
he prevails"; however, the District Court failed to address such in the order and judgment. 
ii. The District Court's second order denying consequential damages 
was improper as it was based upon inaccurate factual conclusions. 
The District court order denying again consequential damages was based upon the 
incorrect finding of fact by the court that the Respondents revoked the bond "after 
finding that an ICE hold had been placed of Mr. Garcia ... " [ emphasis added] (Record, 
148-149). Such ruling was contrary to the evidence which stated the bond was placed 
and revoked on the 15th and the ICE hold was not placed until the 17th of October 2012 
(Record 109-130, paragraph 20) (Record, 135 143, paragraph 17). (Hearing, 6: 4-6) 
(Hearing, 12:6-20) (Hearing, 13:6-10) (Record 109-130, paragraphs 10-17) (Record, 135-
143, paragraphs 12-18). 
The evidence presented reflects that the damages sought by Appellants were 
allowed under Idaho law and denied without opportunity to review or argue. "The 
damages for which compensation is sought need not have been precisely and specifically 
foreseeable", but only "such as were reasonably foreseeable and within the contemplation 
of the parties at the time they made the contract." Suitt.-: v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, NA., 
110 Idaho 15, 22 (1985). Therefore a party cannot contract with a person then disclaim 
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the majority of damages available in a breach of contract because of the immigration 
status of the person he contracted with. 
Just as a party cannot negligently mJure an illegal alien or legal permanent 
resident and avoid paying the full range of appropriate damages, the Respondents in the 
instant case cannot avoid the full range of appropriate damages when he breaches a 
contract. By disallowing the prospect of recovering nonnal consequential damages for 
breach of contract based solely on Appellants' immigration status, this Court risks 
violating Federal Constitutional Rights granted to all persons under the laws outlined 
above including the Fourteenth Amendment. This ruling intrudes upon Congress' 
domain by taking it upon itself to add additional punishments to those who violate 
immigration law. Further, the Idaho Supreme Court has already allowed a party, despite 
his immigration status, to receive normal civil recoveries in a personal injury case. In 
Sanchez v. Galey, Bennett Creek accepted the benefits of the labors of an illegal alien and 
it was anomalous for defendant to complain about his being compensated on the basis of 
the wages he was receiving. Sanchez v. Galey, 733 P. 2d 1234, Idaho Supreme Court 
1986. See also Patino v. Grigg & Anderson Farms, 542 P. 2d 1170, Idaho Supreme 
Court 1975. 
Any speculation by the court that an immigration hold would have been placed 
even if the bond had not been revoked is improper as Jose Luis would have been released 
before the immigration hold could have been placed. Further, even if the speculation that 
an immigration hold would have been placed before Mr. Garcia was released, the 247 
immigration hold pursuant to Federal Regulation 8 CFR 287.7, only lasts for 48 hours 
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and Mr. Garcia would have only suffered 48 hours of incarceration until after bond was 
paid or his criminal case was resolved. 
Even if the speculation was correct that the immigration hold was placed and he 
was not released in 48 hours, Jose Luis would have been taken, processed, and likely 
eligible for an immigration bond several months earlier and not remained in custody 
during the processing of the criminal cases. However, as the Respondents here revoked 
the bond, Appellant was only given the option to be released after he plead guilty, 
causing additional coercion in resolving the matter so that he could be released. 
Plaintiffs may sue on the contract and seek damages based on her expectation 
interest under the contract. Damages based on expectation interest may be measured by 
"the loss in the value to [her] of [Unigard's] performance caused by its failure or 
deficiency, plus any loss, including incidental or consequential, caused by the breach." 
Restatement (Second) Contracts, § 347 (1981 ). In an action on a contract, consequential 
damages are available if such damages were foreseeable, or within the contemplation of 
the parties, at the time the contract was formed. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 
Eng.Rep. 145 (1854); McCormick, Damage§§ 137, 138 (1935); Lamb v. JT Robinson, 
101 Idaho 703, 620 P.2d (1980); JB. Traylor v. Henkels & A1cCoy, Inc., 99 Idaho 560, 
585 P.2d 970 (1978); Nora v. Safeco Ins. Co., 99 Idaho 60,577 1023*1023 P.2d 347 
(1978) (McFadden, J., dissenting). Any damages resulting from breach of the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing would be recoverable to the extent that the party in breach 
had reason to foresee that such loss would be the probable result of the breach at the time 
the contract was made. A foreseeable loss is one which follows from the breach of a 
contract in the ordinary course of events, or even if not in the ordinary course of events a 
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loss which the party in breach had reason to know would result from a breach of the 
covenant. Restatement (Second) Contracts§ 351 (1981). White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 
730 P. 2d 1014, Idaho Supreme Court 1986. 
An injured party may be entitled to consequential damages for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith if "there is something in that contract that suggests that 
they were within the contemplation of the parties and are proved with reasonable 
certainty." Brown's Tie & Lumber Co. v. Chicago Title Co:_,_ 115 Idaho 56, 61, 764 P.2d 
423, 428 (1988). 
Two questions are posed when attempting to determine whether or not damages 
are allowed in a breach of contract, (1) were the damages the result of accident or an 
unusual combination of circumstances which could not reasonably be anticipated? (2) 
Did the party sought to be charged have control of these circumstances? Olson v. 
Quality-Pak Company, 93 Idaho 607 (Idaho 1970). The normal measure of damages for 
delay in constructing a building would be the rental value of the building for the period of 
delay. 5 Corbin on Contracts, § 1092 (1964); 13 Arn.Jur.2d, Building and Construction 
Contracts,§ 76. Olson v. Quality-Pak Company, 93 Idaho 607 (Idaho 1970). 
It was foreseeable to Respondent that if he did not post the bond or revoked it 
without informing the family that an ICE hold would be placed and that Jose Luis would 
remain in custody. It was foreseeable that if a bail bondsmen revokes a bond and retains 
the funds given to him that as a direct result of his breach of contract a plaintiff will 
remain incarcerated and unable to work and enjoy the companionship of family and 
friends. The affidavits and evidence before the court also indicate that the Respondents 
knew of Jose Luis's immigration status and the need to post bond immediately. Rather 
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than perform his duties under the contract Respondents chose to breach it despite 
knowing what the disastrous result to the Appellants would be. Indeed it seems to 
logically follow that Respondents' intent was to see that such results did occur so as to be 
able to take advantage of the situation by retaining the benefit of the bargain without 
performance. 
iii. The Court abused its discretion and should have allowed punitive 
damages. 
The District court order refusing to allow the Appellants to amend their complaint 
was also based upon the incorrect finding of fact by the court that the Respondents 
revoked the bond "after finding that an ICE hold had been placed of Mr. Garcia ... " 
[ emphasis added] (Record, 148-149). Such ruling was contrary to the evidence which 
stated the bond was placed and revoked on the 15th and the ICE hold was not placed until 
the 17th of October 2012 (Record 109-130, paragraph 20) (Record, 135 -143, paragraph 
17). (Hearing, 6: 4-6) (Hearing, 12:6-20) (Hearing, 13:6-10) (Record 109-130, 
paragraphs 10-17) (Record, 135-143, paragraphs 12-18). 
The court does not review the motion to include Punitive Damages against a 
standard of whether the court would award punitive damages, but instead, whether there 
is a reasonable probability that a jury could award such damages based upon the legal 
standard applicable here. Gunter v. Murphy's Lounge, LLC, 141 Idaho 16, 29, 105 P.3d 
676, 689 (2005). 
Punitive damages may be awarded for breach of contract where the conduct is 
outrageous, similar to crime, an intentional tort or carried out with reckless indifference 
for the rights of others. See Jones v. Panhandle Distribs., 792 P.2d 315 (Idaho1990); 
Yacht Club Sales & Serv. v. First Nat 'l Bank, 623 P.2d 464 (Idaho 1980), overruled in 
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part by Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 665 P.2d 661 (Idaho 1983), supra. CF. 
Hoglan v. First Sec. Bank, NA., 819 P.2d 100 (Idaho1991) Uury awarded punitive 
damages where conduct did not evidence a harmful state of mind). The award of punitive 
damages in the context of a contractual relationship requires conduct that is unreasonable 
and irrational in the business context, or that breaches a duty to act in good faith, or that 
shows a lack of professional regard for the consequences of the breach of the contractual 
agreement. Luzar v. W Sur. Co., 692 P.2d 337 (Idaho 1984). Other factors may play a 
determinative role in deciding whether there is substantial evidence of an extreme 
deviation from standards of reasonable conduct: ( 1) the presence of expert testimony; (2) 
whether the unreasonable conduct actually caused harm to the plaintiff; (3) whether there 
is a special relationship between the parties; (4) proof of a continuing course of 
oppressive conduct; and ( 5) proof of the actor's knowledge of the likely consequences of 
the conduct. See Cuddy Mountain Concrete, Inc. v. Citadel Constr., Inc., 824 P.2d 151 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1992). 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently modified and clarified in Hennef'er v. Blaine 
County School Dist. #61. 2015 Opinion No. 33 that an objective, "should-have-known" 
standard is the appropriate standard of recklessness. 
Though the actor must make a conscious choice as to his or her course of 
action, the actor need not subjectively be actually aware of the risk or the 
high probability that harm will result. It is sufficient for a finding of 
recklessness that the actor makes the choice as to his or her course of 
conduct under circumstances where the risk and high probability of harm 
are objectively foreseeable. Although the School cites several cases and 
statutes that apply a more subjective standard for recklessness, none of 
these sources directly address the use of the term "reckless" within the 
context of Idaho Code section 6-1603. Therefore, we find no reason to 
deviate from the directly applicable authority supporting the more 
objective approach. 
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The Supreme Court of Idaho stated in Brown v 1\!lathews, 118 Idaho 830 (Idaho 
1990), when damages are sought for breach of a contractual relationship, whether through 
express contract or implied contract, there can be recovery for emotional distress and 
general damages suffered by the Plaintiffs if the conduct of a defendant has been 
sufficiently outrageous and established in the realm of punitive damages. 
Once the plaintiff has established a reasonable likelihood of proving clear and convincing 
evidence of oppressive, fraudulent, malicious or outrageous conduct by the Defendant, 
"[t]he court shall allow the motion to amend the pleadings." Idaho Code 6-1604 
(emphasis added). 
The Honorable District Judge G. Richard Bevan, provided the following outline 
relating to the process to amend Plaintiffs' complaint that is sought herein: 
A motion to amend to add a punitive damages claim pursuant to LC. § 6-
1604 requires that this court weigh the plaintiffs evidence in exercising its 
discretion. This court does not review the motion against a standard of 
whether it would award punitive damages, but instead, whether there is a 
reasonable probability that a jury could award such damages based upon 
the legal standard applicable here. Gunter v. Mwphy's Lounge, LLC, 141 
Idaho 16, 29, 105 P.3d 676,689 (2005). 
In reviewing the record, the court grants all inferences in favor of 
the plaintiff, as it would on a motion for directed verdict. See Hansen-
Rice, Inc. v.Celotex Corp., 414 F.Supp.2d 970, 979 (D. Idaho 2006) (In 
considering a motion to amend to add a claim for punitive damages under 
LC. §6-1604, the court grants all inferences in favor of the plaintiff); 
Hardenbrook v. United Parcel Services Co., 2009 WL 3530735 (D. Idaho 
2009) (The plaintiffs' assertions in the motion to amend to add a claim for 
punitive damages are "accepted by the court as true");.Cf Vendelin v. 
Costco, 140 Idaho at 430, 95 P.3d at 48 (In determining whether a directed 
verdict should have been granted as to a claim for punitive damages, the 
court must determine whether there was sufficient evidence to justify 
submitting the claim to the jury, viewing as true all adverse evidence and 
drawing every legitimate inference in favor of the party opposing the 
motion for a directed verdict.) Thus, the court views the plaintiffs 
evidence as true, with all inferences taken in behalf of that evidence. 
In actions seeking to recover punitive damages, "the claimant must prove, 
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by clear and convincing evidence, oppressive, fraudulent, malicious or 
outrageous conduct by the party against whom the claim for punitive 
damages is asserted." LC. § 6-1604( 1 ). At this juncture, the plaintiffs 
evidence must be substantial, but not unquestioned. "The 'substantial 
evidence' test does not require the evidence be uncontradicted. It requires 
only that the evidence be of sufficient quantity and probative value that 
reasonable minds could conclude that a verdict in favor of the party 
against whom the motion is made is proper." Vendelin v. Costco 
Wholesale Corp., 140 Idaho 416,430-431,95 P.3d 34, 48-49 (2004) (citing 
Gen. Auto Parts Co., v. Genuine Parts Co., 132 Idaho 849, 855, 979 P.2d 
1207, 1213 (1999)) ... As noted by the Court in Vendelin, "[t}o support a 
motion to add punitive damages under LC. §6-1604, [the moving party is] 
required to establish a reasonable likelihood [they] could prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that [the defendant] acted oppressively, 
fraudulently ... maliciously or outrageously." 140 Idaho at 423, 95 P.3d at 
41. 
An award of punitive damages in this case would also satisfy the two purposes of 
punitive damages as expressed by the Idaho Legislature and the Idaho Supreme Court. 
"[A]n award of punitive damages serves the dual function of deterrence and expressing 
society's outrage." Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 609, 850 P.2d 749, 760 (1993). 
"'Punitive damages' ... serve the public policies of punishing a defendant for outrageous 
conduct and of deterring future like conduct." I.C. § 6-1601(9). 
Permitting a prayer for punitive damages will also serve as a deterrent to others by 
demonstrating that such breaches are serious. In a previous case in which this Court 
upheld a request to amend to include punitive damages the Court noted "There is merit in 
the observation by counsel for the Linscotts in their brief that "[t]he company has 
everything to gain by fighting a bad fight and nothing to lose but interest on its just 
obligation." Linscott v. Ranier Natl. Life Ins. Co., 606 P.2d 958 (1980) The District 
Court's ruling incentivizes purposeful breaches of contract by making the worst case 
scenario a simple return of its obligation, giving the Respondent everyihing to gain and 
nothing to lose by engaging in deceptive and intentionally harmful business practices. 
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Regardless of ones political position on the issue of immigration, the lower courts ruling 
only serves to incentivize knowingly taking advantage of vulnerable clients. It is also 
noteworthy that in this action the Plaintiffs were not even awarded interest on the retained 
sum. Linscott v. Ranier Natl. Life Ins. Co., 606 P.2d 958 (1980) 
V. REQUEST FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
Appellants sent a demand letter under I. C. § 12-120( 1) more than ten days before 
filing suit (Record, 4-13, Exhibit A). Appellants were awarded attorneys fees as they 
prevailed in front of the District Court, therefore they should also be granted attorneys 
fees on appeal. This Court has held previously that "both subsections (1) and (3) of 
Idaho Code§ 12-120 mandate an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party on appeal 
as well as at trial." Cox, v. Mulligan, 142 Idaho 356 (2005). Appellants also request 
attorneys fees and costs on appeal under LC. § 48-608(5) and IRCP 54(d)(l)(B) as the 
prevailing party under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. Finally, Appellants request 
attorneys fees under I.R.C.P. 54( d)(l )(B). 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Respondents revoked the bond before any ICE hold was placed and misled 
the Appellants for the reason for the delay preventing Appellants from posting bond or 
hiring another bondsman. Respondents did so knowing that the likely result would be 
that his client would be incarcerated and later deported. Respondent's stall and 
deception, all the while retaining the money paid to him, resulted in deportation of the 
Appellant with the hope there would be no one left to pursue the return of the benefit and 
payments Respondents received. After default Respondents was simply asked to return 
the money to the Respondents along with a small amount of attorney's fees. The District 
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Court failed to grant Appellants their consequential damages based on immigration status 
and failed to allow Appellants to pursue punitive damages freed. This freed Respondents 
from any accountability. The Respondents' knowing breach caused irreparable and 
severe harm to the Appellants leaves such breaches as the most fiscally advantageous. 
Accordingly, Appellants ask this Court to reverse the decisions of the District Court 
concerning consequential, punitive damages, costs, damages under Idaho Code 48-601 et 
sec, and remand the case back to determine the appropriate amount of damages. 
DATED this 1 day of February 2016. 
Hammond Law Office, PA 
udP 
R(chard L. Hammond 
Attorney for the Appellants 
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